Quimiguing v Icao G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

J. J.B.L. Reyes

Facts:

Icao, a married man, impregnated Quimiging, a minor. As a result, she had to pay for hospitalization and stopped studying. The latter claimed damages Php 120 a month. Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born. The trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.

Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. The plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.

Issue: Is a conceived child entitled to support?

Held: Yes. Petition granted.

Ratio:

A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb).

 Auxiliary reason: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

 (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts

Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 G.R. No. 445

J. Cooper

Facts:

This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.

The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making donations to his second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000; that he has given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to give it to his wife and her relatives.

The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years; that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his administration.

The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

Ratio:

The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the difficulty of applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different situations of persons.

Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate.

Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the Civil Code.)

Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.

While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s property. This can be accounted for only on the grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.

A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his father.

Geluz v CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

J. J. B.L. Reyes

Facts:

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Lazo’s cuase of action was the third and last abortion of his wife to the said doctor.

The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and was aborted when the husband was campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.

The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The doctor appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus

Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:

Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality.

Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the Civil Code) In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.

He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

Jones v Hallahan (1973)

Jones v. Hallahan,

Nov 9, 1973

Appeal from a judgment of the Jefferson County Court

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

Facts:

Marjorie Jones and her partner are female appellants who tried to acquire a license to marry; this was denied to them by the Jefferson Circuit Court. As a result, they appeal from this judgment at the Court Appeals.

Issue:

WON two persons of the same sex can enter marriage.

Held:

No, They can not.

Kentucky statutes do not have a definition of marriage. The Court of Apeals turned to common usage of the term and found marriage to be defined the Webster’s New international Dictionary as:

 “A state of being married, or being united to a person of persons of the opposite sex as husband and wife ; also, the mutual relation of husband and wife; wedlock; abstractly the institution whereby men and women are joined in a special kind of social and legal dependence, for the purpose of founding and maintaining a family.”

In the absence of a specific provision in Kentucky statutes that prohibited marriage between persons of the same sex or whether they issue a license for same sex couples who want to get married, the Court of Appeals turned to customs and concluded that marriage has been defined and understood through time as a union between a man and a woman only.

As a result, appellants cannot avail for themselves of a license to marry because the status they are trying to enter is a nullity.

 Moreover, the right to marry of two persons of the same sex is not constitutionally guaranteed and cannot be invoked in connection with religious freedom. The latter is concomitant with the constitution being superior to professed doctrines and the prevention a citizen becoming a law unto himself.

Decision:

The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Dicta:

A.      Even if the appellants concealed the fact that they were of the same sex and successfully given a license, the resulting relationship (owing to the definition) would not be a marriage.

B.      No constitutionality issue because there is no Consti sanction on the right of marriage between persons of the same sex.

C.       In essence, the relationship proposed by the appellants doesn’t authorize issuance of marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage.

D.      Case of first impression in Kentucky- Baker vs. Nelson dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.

E.       Refusal to issue a license not a punishment

F.       Court of Appeals not presented with an authority to subvert a permanent union between a man and a woman.

Buccat v Buccat (1941)

Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat

April 25, 1941

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

Facts:

Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in Nov 26.

On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.

On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:

Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?   

Held:

No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society rests.

In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

Decision:

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision.  Costs to plaintiff-appellant

In re Santiago (1940)

In Re Atty. Roque Santiago

June 21, 1940

Original Action in the Supreme Court. Malpractice.

Facts:

In this administrative case, the Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Roque Santiago with malpractice and prayed that disciplinary action be taken against him.

The respondent gave legal advice to one Ernesto Baniquit who was living separately from his wife for some nine consecutive years and seeking to contract a second marriage. The respondent assured Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again. The lawyer prepared a document (Exhibit A) stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry again and at the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each member’s right against the party marrying.

 The notary let the husband and wife execute and acknowledge the document and declared that they were again single and as such could contract another marriage. Relying on this document, Baniquit contracted a second marriage.

The respondent, upon realizing his mistake, sent for the parties and let them sign the deed of cancellation (Exhibit C) a month later but after the second marriage of Baniquit.

Issue:

1. Did the lawyer commit malpractice in his acts regarding the dispensation of such advice and preparation of document?

2. Is the document regarding separation (Exhibit A) valid?

Held:

1. Yes. The advice given by the respondent and his preparation and acknowledgment by of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.

2. No. Marriage separation should have should be sanctioned in the proper court and before the separation (see Selanova). Apart from this, the document subverts the vital foundation of the family, marriage, and is contrary to law, morals and public policy.

Decision:

Respondent suspended from practice of law for one year.

Dicta:

A.      As a response to Baniquit’s question, Santiago remarked that he would tear the diploma off the wall if the document did not turn out to be valid.

B.      Santiago was ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving legal advice.

C.      The admission to the practice of law dependent on a lawyer’s remaining as a fit-and-safe person to society. Once he becomes unsafe or unfit to be entrusted with obligations, his professional privilege should be terminated.

Selanova v Mendoza (1975)

Selanova v Mendoza

May 19,1975

Administrative Complaint in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Facts:

Saturino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro  Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document  (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.

The conditions of the liquidation were 

1.  Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and

2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other

In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191 of the old Civil Code that states:

“the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.”

While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of Negros (where the couple resided) for judicial approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed that there was no affirmation from the same court. He still ratified the document.

Issue:

WON the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.

Held:

Yes, it is void.

Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La Rosa vs. Barruga)

Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:

1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband and wife.

Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract legalizing their commission is “contrary to law, morals and public order”, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

Decision:

Respondent  severely censured. 

Dicta:

A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the marriage made article 191 of the Civil Code nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson case to show that subsequent approval of the court can render the marriage dissolved.

The SC argued that the judicial sanction should be secured before the separation.

 B. Disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.

For instance, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary was rebuked for authorizing a document that permitted both spouses to take in concubines without opposition from either spouse.

 In Biton vs. Momongon, a document entitled “Legal Separation” was executed by a notary. The husband and wife were separated mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations in the process, and given the authorization to remarry while not being witnesses against one another. The lawyer was also rebuked.

In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a document that gave a married couple the authorization to marry again while giving them assurance of renouncement of rights one would have against the other. He was suspended from practice.

C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal prohibition in contracts for the personal separation of spouses.

Arroyo v Vasquez (1921)

ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff.  She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees

Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home

2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:

1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.

“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off;  they become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.  In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together.  Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

Perez v Tuason de Perez (1960)

Perez v Tuason de Perez (1960)

Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez at the CFI Manila.

Under the causes of action, he wanted to declare his wife as prodigal and place under guardianship based on the allegations that 1. she was squandering her estate on a young man named Jose Boloix, 2. she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain, and 3. defendant has expressed her desire to marry and have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass her husband.

The CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. WON the trial court erred in holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by Antonio Perez in the complaint.

2. Can Angela Tuason de Perez be declared a prodigal and placed under guardianship under Article 116 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

1. NO

Republic Act no. 1401, creating the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court of the City of Manila and defining its jurisdiction, provides, among other things, that:

          SEC. 38–A—Provision of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act:

          (b) — Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;

RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which has jurisdiction due to the Code’s provision. The law (subsection (d), Sec. 38-A) expressly gives that court exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings under the provisions of Article 116 of the Civil Code.

2. YES

Article 116 of the Civil Code (referred to in subsection [d] above) states:

          When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or brings danger, dishonor or material injury upon the other, the injured party may apply to the court for relief.

          The court may counsel the offended party to comply with his or her duties, and take such measures as may be proper. (now art 72 of the family code)

We are inclined to think that "material injury" as used in Article 116 does not refer to patrimonial (economic) injury or damage, but to personal (i. e. physical or moral) injury to one of the spouses, since Article 116 lies in the chapter concerning personal relations between husband and wife. Nevertheless, the court below was correct in viewing this cause of action as primarily predicated on the grant of guardianship due to alleged prodigality of the wife, since the allegation thereof is therein reiterated, and the remedy of injunction sought against further (i. e. future) acts of disposition (no annulment of her past transactions is demanded) must be necessarily based on the wife's being subject to guardianship.

         If the wife were not in any way incapacitated, the mere fact that the alienation of her paraphernal would deprive the conjugal partnership of the future fruits thereof would not give rise to a cause of action for injunction, since the conjugal partnership is only entitled to the net fruits of such property, after deducting administration expenses (People's Bank vs. Register of Deeds, 60 Phil., 167), and it is nowhere alleged that any such net fruits exist. More fundamental still, the wife's statutory power to alienate her paraphernal (Phil Civil Code, Article 140) necessarily implies power to alienate its future fruits, since the latter are mere accessory to the property itself.

Tolentino v CA (1988)

Tolentino v CA (1988)

Private respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino in 1931. The marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943 pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years.

Arturo Tolentino then married Pilar Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. After that, Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they had 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.

Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed.  Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters).

 In RTC, Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. The CA decision reversed that of the RTC’s.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed

2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

HELD:

1. Yes

In Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.

Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues.

The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951. 

She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.

2. No

Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.

On the Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC. The wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname.  She cannot be prevented from using it, but neither can she restrain others from using it.

Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties.  Effect of divorce was more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as “Mrs. of the husband” even if he has remarried.

If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino.  Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right.

There was no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname.  Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name.  It consists with the possibility of confusion of identity. The elements of usurpation were 1. Actual use of another’s name, 2. Use is unauthorized, 3. Use of another’s name is to designate personality or identity of a person. None of these elements were present in the case because public knowledge referred to Constancia as the legal wife of Arturo, and Consuelo did represent herself after the divorce as Mrs. Arturo Tolentino.

Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case is not applicable.  In Silva, it was not mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant’s representation that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife.

Thurman v Torrington (1984)

Thurman v City of Torrington (1984)

Facts:

Tracey Thurman was the victim of her husband’s, Charles Thurman, repeated harassments and physical abuse. Such instances were on October 1982 when Charles Thurman attacked Tracey Thurman at the home of Judy Bentley and Richard St. Hilaire in the city of Torrington. He took by force their son Charles J. Thurman, Jr. Mr. St.-Hilaire filed a complaint but the police officers of refused to take a complaint—even of trespassing.

The acts of harassment continued. Even when her husband was finally arrested after attacking her in full view of a policeman and after a judge issued an order prohibiting him to go to his wife's home, the police continued to ignore Thurman's pleas for help. Her husband violated the order and came to her house and threatened her. When she asked the police to arrest her husband for violating his probation and threatening her life, they ignored her. She obtained a restraining order against her husband, which he violated, but again the police failed to take any action.

This culminated when Charles Thurman appeared at the Bentley–St. Hilaire residence in the early afternoon and demanded to speak to Tracey Thurman. Tracey, remaining indoors, called the police department asking that Charles be picked up for violation of his probation. After about 15 minutes, Tracey went outside to try to persuade him not to take or hurt Charles Jr. Charles suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the chest, neck, and throat.

At the duration of these events, police officers acted ineptly in handling the wife-battering situation. At the time when Tracy was stabbed, Officers DeAngelo, Nukirk, and Columbia arrived on the scene but still permitted Charles Thurman to wander about the crowd and continue to threaten Tracey. Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again, this time while she was lying on a stretcher, Charles Thurman was arrested and taken into custody.

It was eventually found out that Charles worked as a counterman and short order cook at Skie’s Diner. There he served many members of the Torrington Police Department, including some of the officers in this case. While at work, Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he intended to “get” his wife and that he intended to kill her.

Tracy then filed a complaint in the Federal Court and sued the city for the lack of equal protection in the application of social services, and that this violated the 14^th amendment of the U.S. Constitution, particularly the inept police response to a husband beating up a wife. The City brought a motion to dismiss her claims. The City…argues that the equal protection clause [no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws] “only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially motivated.”

Issue: WON the plaintiffs have properly alleged a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Held:

Yes, the application of the equal protection clause is not limited to racial classifications or racially motivated discrimination. Classifications on the basis of gender will be held invalid under the equal protection clause unless they are substantially related to strike down classifications which are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.

Tracey Thurman alleges that the city uses an administrative classification that manifests itself in discriminatory treatment that violates the equal protection clause. Police protection in the City of Torrington, they argue, is fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship. But the Torrington police have consistently afforded lesser protection, plaintiffs allege, when the victim is (1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or (2) a child abused by a father or stepfather.

City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal safety of persons in the community. This duty applies equally to women whose personal safety is threatened by individuals with whom they have or have had a domestic relationship as well as to all other persons whose personal safety is threatened, including women not involved in domestic relationships. If officials have notice of the possibility of attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons, they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in the community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Tracey Thurman alleges there is an administrative classification used to implement the law in a discriminatory fashion. It is well settled that the equal protection clause is applicable not only to discriminatory legislative action, but also to discriminatory governmental action in administration and enforcement of the law.

A city may be sued for damages under § 1983 when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by the body’s officers” or is “visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decision-making channels.”

Some degree of specificity is required in pleading a custom or policy. A plaintiff must typically point to the facts outside his own case to support his allegation of a policy on the part of a municipality. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff Tracey Thurman has specifically alleged in her statement of facts a series of acts and omissions on the part of the defendant police officers and police department that took place over the course of eight months. From this particularized pleading a pattern emerges that evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the police department to the complaints of the plaintiff Tracey Thurman and to its duty to protect her. Such an ongoing pattern of deliberate indifference raises an inference of “custom” or “policy” on the part of the municipality. Furthermore, this pattern of inaction climaxed on June 10, 1983 in an incident so brutal that under the law of the Second Circuit that “single brutal incident may be sufficient to suggest a link between a violation of constitutional rights and a pattern of police misconduct.” Finally, a complaint of this sort will survive dismissal if it alleges a policy or custom of condoning police misconduct that violates constitutional rights and alleges “that the City’s pattern of inaction caused the plaintiffs any compensable injury.”

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:

 Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character."

On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.

Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

Issues:   

1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.

2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:

1. YES

 At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.

For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.

Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.

2. YES

The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.

But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".