Friday, February 17, 2012

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Monday, February 6, 2012

Ang Tibay v CIR (1940) 69 Phil 635

J. Laurel

Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely accept the views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.
The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law.
Evidence was still inaccessible.
The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

J. Cruz

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in 1984 and these wer confiscated by the station commander in Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former president under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law.

Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?

Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.

The lower courts are not prevented from examining the constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, “courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.”
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of legislative authority over the president under Amendment number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to avoid controvery. In the due process clause, however, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was due to the avoidance of an “iron rule “laying down a stiff command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its interpretation like a straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or rational connection between facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and is restrained by dure process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626 which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subjectas the original executive order, it can’t be said that it complies with the existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it.
There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police power because the method toconfiscate carabos was oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against the separataion of powers.
The policeman wasn’t liable for damages since the law during that time was valid.

Agustin v Edu (1979) 88 SCRA 195

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu.  His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this.
The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.
The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisition cost.
The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory.
Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of police power, equal protection, and due process/
2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set.
Hence the petition.
The OSG denied the allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police power to such acts.
The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty.
The case also says that police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.
Primicias v Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people.
J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.
Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive.
SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature and purpose of the driver is concerned.
Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision.
LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.
The objective is public safety.
The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the decvlaration of principles in the Constitution.
On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have no settled legal doctrines.

Espleta v Avelino (1975) 62 SCRA 395

J. Fernando

Shell’s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espleta’s witness Montano for cross-examination and the conlusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony  and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeleta’s testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta’s counsel’s letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montano’s testimony due to her being stricken from the records. 
In essence, there was partiality on the part of the judge.

Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?

Held: No. Petition for certiorari granted

Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shell’s proposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline leakages.
Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didn’t satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.
By saying that the postponement of the counsel was a delay on the administration of justice was not in line with Justice Carson’s saying that “a sound discretion in this regard should be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance.”
Due heed must be paid to procedural due process mandate.
Ching Hong So- when a party litigant without malice or fault is not prepared for trial, the court can exceed the discretion on it by law in denying to him the opportunity to prepare and obtain due process
However, the controlling doctrine can be seen Capitol Subdivision v Negros  where liberality must be exercised in postponing trial to obtain material evidence and prevent miscarriage of justice
The discretion for denying motions is allowed but such must be exercised with a view to substantial justice.
In Luciano v Tan, procedural due process requires the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant postmonet then subsequently cured by the court reopening the case to comply with such a requirement.
The judge in this case must have reconsidered the denial.
Bellaflor’s pleadings displayed a total lack of awareness of due process in the implications of his petition because of his assertion that the constitional question was essential factual.

Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756

J. Gancayo
Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked when his father’s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation.
Charges of deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability.
The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID.
They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied.
Earlier, Manuel Chia’s case of falsification of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147.
The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition for injunctive relief was denied by the CFI of Manila.
They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias mfr was denied.
In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they weren’t subject to immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA’s overstepping of appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn’t make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses.

1. Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation?

Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens

Section 37 of the Immigration act states:
SEC. 37. (a)          The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

(1)          Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided that:
No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.
On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene.

Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769

J. Carpio-Morales

A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”
It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response to killings and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real intent of management”.

In re Petition for Melissa Roxas (2010)

Melissa Roxas was a Filipino-American activist who was abducted by alleged soldiers under the presumption that she was an NPA member. She was a member of Bayan and was in Tarlac for a Medical mission.
Together with two companions, she was in the house of one Mr. Paolo when 15 armed men banged at the door and seized her. They blindfolded her.
She believed she was being taken to Ft. Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija after estimating the travel time. She saw the faces of her captors. She was tortured under the premise of making her renounce her communist beliefs. She was released. The abductors still did surveillance on her.
In her petition of writ of amparo and habeas data in the supreme court, against certain gov’t officials, she asked:
1. respondent government officials be enjoined from harming her family
2.inspection of detention area  conditions in ft Magsaysay, nueva ecija
3. disclosure of documents regarding the spec ops group of the afp
4. expunge the docs regarding Roxas
5. return the belongings taken from her.
The case was brought to the court of appeals. To dismiss the petition, the respondents averred:
1. the abduction was done with the petitioner’s consent (stage-managed to smear the gov’t.)
2. the petitioner’s medical certificate showed only abrasions on her knees and wrists.
3. The president was immune from suit
4. no specific allegation that the government officials in question committed these atrocities
The CA was convinced that she was abducted. They gave credence to her MC. They court also acknowledged the abductors’ acts of monitoring her and called for the amparo as a duty for the respondents to protect her. They also noted a breach of informational privacy committed by Palparan when her showed videos of her in a training camp for guerillas and told the court about insider infor about Roxas’ joining the NPA. They weren’t convinced that the military was behind the abduction, though.
Hence she petitioned the SC.
1. Did the court of Appeals err in absolving the gov’t officials in the amparo proceeding?
2. Can her belongings be returned?
3. Can Ft. Magsaysay be inspected?
4. Can Habeas Data be used as a remedy?
Held: No to all four. Petition dismissed.
1. Petitioner- there was sufficient evidence of her abduction by govt due to the sound of guns and airplanes. She impleaded generals, the president, and the DND chief due to the doctrine of command responsibility.
Court- incorrect due to being substantive law that established liability in an amparo proceeding.
Hague Conventions As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
C.R. is more aptly invoked in a criminal or administrative proceeding than one in amparo.
Amparo is part of “remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.”
It is an action for relief available to the petitioner, not used to determine proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The commanders may be impleaded on accountability or responsibility
From the case:
“Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. “
“Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.”
On responsibility, the court said that the petitioner alleged that the generals had in one way condoned her abduction due to her assertion that govt agents were behind her torture and capture, the inclusion of the military base, etc. However, the evidence doesn’t warrant the conclusion that they were really military. One, the similarity with her abduction to older cases of abduction don’t really point that the government orchestrated that.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
There was no direct evidence as regard the affiliation of the abductors.
With regard to ft Magsaysay, the claim that she was taken there can’t be tenable due to her status as a traveller and her blindfolded state.
2. An order directing respondents to return belongings is a conclusive pronouncement of liability which can be done in a full proceeding. Also, a writ of amparo cant be used to protect property rights.
3. A fishing expedition for evidence cant be sanctioned by a writ of amparo.  
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. The place msut be reasonably determinable from the party’s allegations. Her estimates were unreliable.
4. The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals. It protects a persons right to control information regarding himself, especially when the info is being collected through unlawful means for unlawful ends.
To issue the writ there must be showing of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim, which she failed to do.
The court turned the investigation to the CHR. Habeas data was reversed. 

Romines v People (2010) GR no. 182010

J. Carpio-Morales

Romines was caught in possession of 0.1224 grams of shabu when Cruzin, a police officer in a surveillance operation for a snatcher named Ryan saw her place a sacheted white substance in a cigarette case.
She ran from the policeafter being questioned and was subsequently caught in a stop-and –frisk operation after the law enforcer asked her about the sachet contents.
She and the contents were tested for drug presence. The latter was confirmed to be shabu.
Her alibi was that the evidence was used to frame her when the police dangled a wallet containing shabu near her in the detention facility.
In court, she admitted to the truth of the toxicology report on the substance and the presence of shabu in her body.
The trial court convicted her under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous drugs Act.
In the Appellate court, she contended that the arrest without a warrant was illegal.
The appellate court found her arrest valid in People v Chua where the stop-and-frisk operation was established as an exception to warrantless arrests.
In the Supreme Court, she contended that Cruzin failed to justify the hunch that there was a criminal act in the placement of something in a case. The OSG contended for a penalty modification.

Issue: Is her arrest without a warrant valid?

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.

She only raised the issue of warrantless arrest on the AC- clearly an omission on questioning the legality of her arrest.
The circumstances made the arrest as a warranted one. It was instinctive for a law enforcer to notice something suspicious about the white substance.
A stop and frisk operation is part of the exception of a valid search warrant. In such instances where the exception applies, a judicial question can be posed to determine if the circumstance warrants a reasonable search. This includes the manner of the search, the place or thing searched, and the nature of the articles produced by the act.
People v Chua: The policeman must introduce himself and make inquiries and restrain a person who manifests suspicious conduct. He must have a genuine reason to warrant the belief that the person has contraband.
Purpose of stop and frisk is a. general crime prevention under the recognition that a policeman can approach a person for possible criminal behavior, given that the conduct was carried out in an appropriate manner.
Cruzin followed the procedure.
Romines also admitted to the truth of the toxicology reports in reference to her defense. The admission tested her credibility. (which showed her to be unreliable)
The petitioner also failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support her theory of frame-up.

Castillo v Cruz (2009) Gr No 182165

J. Morales

Respondent Cruz spouses leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos. They refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The local government filed charges in the MTC, which in turn decided against the spouses.
RTC affirmed the decision.
The spouses didn’t vacate and continued to file cases in the Malolos RTC. The court suspended the demolition against the property, a determination of the property bounds, and a remanding of the case by means of a writ of injunction.
The respondents filed a MFR in the MTC. The court ruled in their favor and issued another demolition order.
In order to stop the demolition, the spouses parked container vans around the property.
Superintendent Castillo was told by the mayor to enter the property for maintaining its possession.
Respondents refused. The y filed for a Petition for a writ of amparo and habeas data in Malolos RTC
The same people claimed that the respondents entered the property forcefully with heavy equipment  and arrested them. RTC ruled in their favor.

Issue:  Is the writ of amparo and habeas data the correct remedy for the spouses predicament?

Held: No. Petition dismissed

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
As a response to extrajudicial killings, the court promulgated the Rule on the Writ of Amparo on Oct. 24, 2007 and the Rule on Habeas Data on 2008. This power was inherent in the Constitutional grant to the courts to promulgate rules for human rights.
Definitions of the Writs:
a. Writ of Amparo- an available course of action “to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity”
b. Writ of Habeas Data- a course that can be taken when the “right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person”.
The limitation of the writs was in the protection of rights of life, liberty, and security.
Sec of National Defense v Manalo- limitation of the Amparo was to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
There must be a violation of these rights by means of an unlawful act. There must be a connection between the acts and effects of the aforementioned rights.
Tapuz v Del Rosario- “What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.  Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.”
The same case states that the court will only issue the writ after determining the facts ‘ existence from the supporting affidavits of thNotably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.”
There was no threat to the said rights by the petitioners use of force. They were only protecting property rights. Their affidavit said: “Wala kaming nagawa  ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming “IN POSSESSION.”
Regarding habeas data, there was no allegation of the data collection requirement.
The writs cant be used to stall the execution of a property dispute decision.
The filing should have been barred after their arrest. This was due to the institution of criminal proceedings running first. They may avail of the reliefs as a motion.
The filed the writs in the Sandiganbayan, but dismissed for form shopping and insufficiency.