Showing posts with label procedural due process. Show all posts
Showing posts with label procedural due process. Show all posts

Monday, February 6, 2012

Ang Tibay v CIR (1940) 69 Phil 635

J. Laurel

Facts:
Toribio claimed to have laid off workers due to the shortage of leather soles in the Ang Tibay factory.
The Court of industrial relations forwarded a motion for recon with the supreme court.
In pursuit of a retrial in the Court of Industrial Relations, the national labor union, the respondent, averred:
1. The shortage of soles has no factual basis
2. The scheme was to prevent the forfeiture of his bond to cover the breach of obligation with the Army
3. The letter he sent to the army was part of this scheme
4. The company union was an employer dominated one.
5. laborers rights to CBA is indispensable.
6. Civil code shouldn’t be used to interpret a legislation of American industrial origins.
7. Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for favoring his union.
8. Exhibits are inaccessible to respondents.
9. The exhibits can reverse the judgment.

Issue: Is the Court of Industrial Relations the proper venue for the trial?

Held: Yes. Case remanded to the CIR

Ratio:
There was no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
The nature of the CIR is that of an administrative court with judicial and quasi-judicial functions for the purpose of settling disputes and relations between employers and employees. It can appeal to voluntary arbitration for dispute. It can also examine the industries in a locality by order of the president.
There is a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which constitutes a departure from the separation of powers.
The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and is not bound by technical rules of legal procedure. It may also include any matter necessary for solving the dispute.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
Some examples that it must follow are:
1. right to a hearing
2. consideration of evidence by the court
3. duty to deliberate implies a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached
4. substance of evidence and the non-binding aspect of judicial decisions in an admin court so as to free them from technical rules
5. the decision must be rendered at the evidence presented at the hearing. The court may also delegate some powers to other judicial bodies.
6. The court must act on its own decision at reaching a controversy. It mustn’t merely accept the views of a subordinate.
7. The court must clearly state the issues and the rationale for the decision.
The record is barren and doesn’t satisfy a factual basis as to predicate a conclusion of law.
Evidence was still inaccessible.
The motion for a new trial should be granted and sent to the CIR.



Espleta v Avelino (1975) 62 SCRA 395

J. Fernando

Facts:
Shell’s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espleta’s witness Montano for cross-examination and the conlusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony  and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeleta’s testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta’s counsel’s letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montano’s testimony due to her being stricken from the records. 
In essence, there was partiality on the part of the judge.

Issue:
Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?

Held: No. Petition for certiorari granted

Ratio:
Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shell’s proposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline leakages.
Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didn’t satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.
By saying that the postponement of the counsel was a delay on the administration of justice was not in line with Justice Carson’s saying that “a sound discretion in this regard should be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance.”
Due heed must be paid to procedural due process mandate.
Ching Hong So- when a party litigant without malice or fault is not prepared for trial, the court can exceed the discretion on it by law in denying to him the opportunity to prepare and obtain due process
However, the controlling doctrine can be seen Capitol Subdivision v Negros  where liberality must be exercised in postponing trial to obtain material evidence and prevent miscarriage of justice
The discretion for denying motions is allowed but such must be exercised with a view to substantial justice.
In Luciano v Tan, procedural due process requires the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant postmonet then subsequently cured by the court reopening the case to comply with such a requirement.
The judge in this case must have reconsidered the denial.
Bellaflor’s pleadings displayed a total lack of awareness of due process in the implications of his petition because of his assertion that the constitional question was essential factual.