Espleta v Avelino (1975) 62 SCRA 395

J. Fernando

Facts:

Shell’s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espleta’s witness Montano for cross-examination and the conlusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony  and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeleta’s testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta’s counsel’s letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montano’s testimony due to her being stricken from the records. 

In essence, there was partiality on the part of the judge.

Issue:

Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge?

Held: No. Petition for certiorari granted

Ratio:

Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shell’s proposed amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline leakages.

Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. The trial didn’t satisfy the standard for a judicious inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.

By saying that the postponement of the counsel was a delay on the administration of justice was not in line with Justice Carson’s saying that “a sound discretion in this regard should be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice rather than accede to a reasonable request for a continuance.”

Due heed must be paid to procedural due process mandate.

Ching Hong So- when a party litigant without malice or fault is not prepared for trial, the court can exceed the discretion on it by law in denying to him the opportunity to prepare and obtain due process

However, the controlling doctrine can be seen Capitol Subdivision v Negros  where liberality must be exercised in postponing trial to obtain material evidence and prevent miscarriage of justice

The discretion for denying motions is allowed but such must be exercised with a view to substantial justice.

In Luciano v Tan, procedural due process requires the infirmity consisting in a refusal to grant postmonet then subsequently cured by the court reopening the case to comply with such a requirement.

The judge in this case must have reconsidered the denial.

Bellaflor’s pleadings displayed a total lack of awareness of due process in the implications of his petition because of his assertion that the constitional question was essential factual.

Selanova v Mendoza (1975)

Selanova v Mendoza

May 19,1975

Administrative Complaint in the Supreme Court. Gross Ignorance of the Law.

Facts:

Saturino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro  Mendoza with gross ignorance of the law for preparing and ratifying a document  (November 21, 1972) extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.

The conditions of the liquidation were 

1.  Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and

2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit against the other

In his judgment, respondent relied on Par. 4, Art 191 of the old Civil Code that states:

“the husband and wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.”

While the judge claimed that he asked the CFI of Negros (where the couple resided) for judicial approval, the Judicial Consultant confirmed that there was no affirmation from the same court. He still ratified the document.

Issue:

WON the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.

Held:

Yes, it is void.

Precedents (Quintana vs. Lerma, De Luna vs. Linatoc, De La Rosa vs. Barruga)

Under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, the following shall be void:

1. Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;

2. Every extrajudicial agreement during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community property between husband and wife.

Moreover, while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, they are crimes punishable by the RPC, and a contract legalizing their commission is “contrary to law, morals and public order”, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.

Decision:

Respondent  severely censured. 

Dicta:

A. Respondent Judge claimed that prohibition of the extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the marriage made article 191 of the Civil Code nugatory. He cited Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson case to show that subsequent approval of the court can render the marriage dissolved.

The SC argued that the judicial sanction should be secured before the separation.

 B. Disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.

For instance, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, the notary was rebuked for authorizing a document that permitted both spouses to take in concubines without opposition from either spouse.

 In Biton vs. Momongon, a document entitled “Legal Separation” was executed by a notary. The husband and wife were separated mutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations in the process, and given the authorization to remarry while not being witnesses against one another. The lawyer was also rebuked.

In In re Santiago, a lawyer/ respondent prepared a document that gave a married couple the authorization to marry again while giving them assurance of renouncement of rights one would have against the other. He was suspended from practice.

C. The judge was truly unaware of the legal prohibition in contracts for the personal separation of spouses.