Villar v TIP G.R. No. L-69198 April 17, 1985

CJ Fernando

"extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction," which this Court considered as a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition

Facts:

In Malabanan v. Ramento, it was held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer. If that were then, the petitioners are entitled to the remedy prayed for. There is, however, this other circumstance to be taken into consideration. In the opposition to the petition for preliminary mandatory injunction, reference was made to the academic records of petitioners.

Two of the petitioners, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., and Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr., had only one failing grade each, with the first having failed in only one subject in either semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear and the second having failed in only one subject, having passed in eight other subjects in the 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Venecio Villar failed in two subjects but passed in four subjects in the first semester of the academic year, 1983-1984. Petitioner Inocencio F. Recitis passed all his subjects in the first semester of 19831984 schoolyear and had one failing grade during its second semester. He had two failing grades during the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Noverto Barreto, had five failing grades in the first semester of schoolyear 1983-1984, six failing grades in the second semester of the same schoolyear, and six failing grades in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioner Edgardo de Leon, Jr., had three failing grades, one passing grade and one subject dropped in the first semester of schoolyear 1984-1985. Petitioner Regloben Laxamana had five failing grades with no passing grade in the first semester of 1984-1985 schoolyear. Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana could be denied enrollment in view of such failing grades. Respondent educational institution is under no obligation to admit them this coming academic year. The constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning justifies such refusal.

Issue: Whether or not the exercise of the freedom of assembly on the part of certain students of respondent Technological Institute of the Philippines could be a basis for their being barred from enrollment.

Held:

No. Petitioners Venecio Villar, Rufino G. Salcon, Jr., Romeo L. Guilatco, Jr. and Inocencio F. Recites are entitled to the writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Ratio:

Malabanan v. Ramento, -held that respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for a negative answer.

Same case- As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of public interest without censorship or punishment and which 'is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent."

Same case- Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, they are entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.

Petitioners, therefore, have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College.

What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities.

As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005

J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:

 Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story” produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.

 PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.

MTRCB alleged that respondents

1) Did not submit “the inside story” to petitioner for review

2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations

ABS-CBN averred:

1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press

2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program

MTRCB affirmed the ruling

Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program “Inside Story”, they being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper

Hence, this petition

Issue:

Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV.

Held:

Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:

Xxx

b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials

The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS

*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.

Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc

It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it

The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986

1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies

2) Newsreels

In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels.

MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as “straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels.

Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioner’s power of review.

Issue related to Consti law:

Petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to “prior restraint.”

Ratio:

It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, “designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x.”  Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.

Respondents claim that the showing of “The Inside Story” is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press.  However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status.

If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom “The Inside Story” which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.

The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

Pita V CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989

J. Sarmiento

Facts:

In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene. These were later burned.  One of the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.

He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure.

Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments were not raided.

The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.

On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".

On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit

The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is not without restraint.

In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:

1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?

Held: No. Petition granted

Ratio:

Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall

Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." (Kottinger)

When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be offensive to human sensibilities?

The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor divided.

Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."

Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is "obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.

The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity" has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional dimension of the problem.

Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable to society.

In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation.

But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.

Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the burden to show this lies with the authorities.

"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger."

As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1) clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech.

The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude that the fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the permission to execute high-handed acts.

It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.

There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account fo a crime committed.

The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".

 Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.

Gonzales v Katigbak G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985

CJ Fernando

Facts:

Antonio Gonzales, president of Malaya Films, claimed that his film Kapit sa Patalim, was rated for adults only by a subcommittee of the movie review board together with the required cuts and scene deletions. He justified that these requirements were without basis and were restrains on artistic expression. He adduced that the film is an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification.

He appealed to the movie review board but the same affirmed the decion of the sub committee.

When Gonzales appealed to the supreme court, the board claimed that the deletions were removed and the requirement to submit the master negative was taken out but the film was still rated for adults only. The petition was amended to contest the rating only.

Issue: Was the rating made with grave avuse of discretion (Note I put in those regarding obscenity for future purposes)

Held: No. Petition dismissed. There was no grave abuse of discretion DUE TO LACK OF VOTES

Ratio:

Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse

Burstyn-importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform

(No clear dividing line between what affords knowledge and that of pleasure or else there will be a diminution to a right to self-expression)

Bagatsing- Press freedom may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.”

Censorship doesn’t full cover free speech or there might bean emasculation of basic rights. However, there must be in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right without denying the freedom from liability.

Freedom from censorship is a settled principle in our jurisdiction. Mutuc- board of review is limited to classification of films to safeguard other constitutional objections, hence the GP, PG, or R-18 ratings.

That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity

The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable.

Where movies are concerned, censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.

Roth- "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance — unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.”

Given obscenity as the nemesis of censorship, there is difficulty in determining what is obsecene.

Roth- The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons

The test was whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. Some material can legitimately deal with sex and its effects on susceptible persons. Such a censorship can be considered violative of the constitution. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.

Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.

In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard.

Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State.

Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene.

On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former.

There can be no valid objection to the controlling standard.

There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive.

But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might misunderstand the scenes.  The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused.

The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.

It is hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.