Libres v NLRC G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999

J. Bellosillo

Facts:

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager.  He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual harrassment filed against him by the VP's secretary Capiral. This was included with a waiver of his right tobe heard once he didn't comment.

On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory interrogation.

The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor." They suspended Libres for 30 days without pay.

He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter, but the latter held that the company acted with due process and that his punishment was only mild.

Moreover, he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the massaging of her shoulders    never “discriminated against her continued employment,” “impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code,” or “created a hostile, intimidating or offensive environment.”

He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't given the right be heard. This was due to his demand for personal confrontation not being recognized by the MEC.

In the Supreme Court, petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 or the law against sexual harassment to the instant case. Moreover, petitioner also contends that public respondent’s reliance on Villarama v. NLRC and Golden Donuts was misplaced.  He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga’s immediate filing of her letter of resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint against him.  He now surmises that the filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint, hence, the Villarama case should have no bearing on the instant case.

Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for personal confrontatiom?

Held: Yes Petition denied.

Ratio:

On not strictly applying RA 7877- Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of.  It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter.  As a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public.  Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter.  In so doing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee committing sexual harassment on a subordinate.  The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into insignificance.  On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination.  Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day suspension by the NLRC, Villarama, in the other case was penalized with termination. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics.  He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity.  And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. 

“It is the  the duty of every employer to protect his employees from oversexed superiors.” Public respondent therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful for.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres was Capiral’s immediate superior.  Fear of retaliation and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually suffer, are all realities that Capiral had to contend with.  Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts.  Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral’s allegations.  In fact his narration even corroborated the latter’s assertion in several material points.  He only raised issue on the complaint’s protracted filing.

On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with.  Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding.  Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.  The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session He was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances.

Personal confrontation was not necessary. Homeowners v NLRC- litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.

JMM v NLRC (1993)

JMM Promotions & Management, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Ulpiano L. De Los Santos, respondents.

Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:

1.       Following Secs. 4 and 17, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules, the petitioner, a recruiting agency, made the following:

a.       Paid the license fee (Sec. 4)

b.      Posted a cash bond of 100k and surety bond of 50k(Sec. 4)

c.       Placed money in escrow worth 200k (Sec. 17)

2.       The petitioner wanted to appeal a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to the respondent NLRC, but the latter dismissed the appeal because of failure of the petitioner to post an appeal bond required by Sec. 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.  The decision being appealed involved a monetary award.

3.       The petitioner contended that its payment of a license fee, posting of cash bond and surety bond, and placement of money in escrow are enough; posting an appeal bond is unnecessary.  According to Sec. 4, the bonds are posted to answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment.  On the other hand, according to Sec. 17, the escrow shall answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims.

4.       Sec. 6 reads:

“In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond…”

The bonds required here are different from the bonds required in Sec. 4.

Issue: Was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond despite the fact that it has posted bonds of 150k and placed 200k in escrow before?

Held:

Yes.  It is possible for the monetary reward in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of 350,000 because of the stringent requirements posed upon recruiters. The reason for such is that overseas employees are subjected to greater risks and hence, the money will be used to insure more care on the part of the local recruiter in its choice of foreign principal to whom the worker will be sent.

Doctrine: Construction:

It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions.  Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.  “That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.”

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. With regard to the present case, the doctrine can be applied when the Court found that Sec. 6 complements Sec. 4 and Sec. 17.

In the POEA Rules, the bonds required in Sec. 4 Rule 2, Book 2 and the escrow required in Sec. 17 Rule 2, Book 2 have different purposes from the appeal bond required in Sec. 6, Rule 5 Book 7.

The bonds in Sec. 4 are made to answer for all claims against the employer, which is not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated.

The escrow agreement in Sec. 17 is used only as a last resort in claiming against the employer.

On the other hand, Sec. 6 requires an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.  Indeed, this appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award.  Also, it is possible that the monetary award may exceed the bonds posted previously and the money placed in escrow.  If such a case happens, where will the excess be sourced?  To solve such a dilemma, an appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary award is required by Sec. 6.

Dai Chi v Villarama (1994)

Dai-Chi v Villarama (RTC judge) and Limjuco

On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi electronics filed a complaint for damages with RTC branch 156 for an employee’s (Limjuco) violation of their contract in 1990 which stipulated that the termination of service of an employee restricted him from working in a company which has a similar set of products or ventures for a span of 2 years following the termination of service.

The petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of such a company called Angel Sound with the same position as head of material management control before the 2 years was up.

The petitioner sought to claim 100k in damages and prevent the former employee from working in the rival business within the 1 year timespan.

The respondent court under villarama claimed that it had no jurisdiction because the complaint was for damages from labor-employee relations and should be adjudicated under the Labor Arbiter under Art 217 s 4 of the LC.

The petitioner asked for reversal because the case was recognizable under the regular courts and that the cause of action didn’t arise from employee-employer relationships even if the claim was in the employee’s contract.

Issue: Is the petitioner’s claim for damages one arising from employee-employer relations?

Decision: No, petition granted

1. Art 217 s4 of the LC stipulated that Labor Arbiters have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for workers with claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations.

The court held that the cuase of action was under Civil Law, not the labor code. Why?

 The petitioner sought to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for respondent’s breach of his contractual obligation to its damage and prejudice. He also didn’t ask for relief under the Labor Code.

The applicable case law was Singapore airlines v Pano where the employer’s claim for damages was based on wanton failure and refusal without just cause to report to duty coupled with the averment that the employee maliciously and with bad faith violated the contract. The employee didn’t report for duty as a course of convention training- quasi-delict diba!

There must be a causal connection for claims provided in the RT217 S4 OF THE LC. Only when there is such a connection with other claims can damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.

2. In SMC v NLRC, the interpretation of Art 217 then was focused on in the phrase “all money claims of workers” in par 3.

There was no phrase “arising from employer-employee relations at that time” (art 217 amended by bp blg 227, not yet the present labor code)

DOCTRINE: The use of noscitur a sociis wherein the entire universe of family claims asserted by workers has been observed into the exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.

Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par 4 in the present labor code) of art 217 wherein it was read in relation to par 1 (unfair labor practices), par 2 (terms and conditions of employment), par 4 (household services) and par 5 (restrictions on activities of employees and employers)

There was a unifying element which referred to cases out of employer-employee relations.

Money claims that didn’t arise out of such relations was to be taken in by regular courts. The claims should have a causal connection with employer-employee relations

In Ocheda, the action based on tort or quasi-delict with no such causal connection was in the juris of the regular courts.

In pepsi-cola, the action by employees against the malicious filing of the employer of a criminal complaint against them was with the regular courts.

The rationale for the Dai-chi case was that the complaint for damages wasn’t anchored on term of employee’s service but the effects of such term.

Cases decided under the earlier version of Art 217 was also consistent in allocating civil disputes bet employers and employes to the realm of the regular courts. In Medina (1929), the civil complaint for damagaes against the employer for slanderous remarks against the employtess were tried in the civil courts. In Laron (1984), the court held that the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the labor code wasn’t involved.